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Delegatable Access Control for Fine-Grained XML
Jing Wu , Jennifer Seberry, Yi Mu
School of IT and CS
University of Wollongong, Australia
jw91,jennie,ymu@uow.edu.au
Abstract
The access control mechanisms are critical to ensure security in XML (eXtensible Markup Language). Several such
mechanisms have been used or proposed; however, the notion of delegation in XML has not been studied in the literature. In this paper, we propose an access control model
encapsuling delegation authorization rules for XML documents that allow flexible data granularity and limited inference protection. Our access control policy specification
is basically DTD-based. It can also be considered to be
document-based.

1. Introduction
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) has recently
emerged as the most relevant standardization effort in
the area of document representation through markup languages. The XML mark-up technology also plays a central
role for developing the semantic web [12]. XML was initially introduced as a data format for documents; therefore,
many researchers assumed well-known techniques for securing documents to be straightforwardly applicable to
XML data. With authentication, the server will know what
information can be sent to the user based on that user’s access level, whereas encryption will only let users with
decryption keys see the message [7].
An Access control service is needed when some people
want to block or allow access to an entire XML instance,
while others would like to control access at the tag level.
Developing an access control model, and related mechanism, in terms of XML is an important step. In Role-based
access control (RBAC), the senior role inherits junior role’s
permission by virtue of the role hierarchy. But, the junior
role is not allowed to carry out the permission, which is only
granted to the senior or other role groups [11]. It would be
desirable to specify delegation authorizations for the rolebased XML environment. With the rapid development of
web environments XML data access control has been inten-
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sively studied (e.g., [2, 9, 5, 6, 4, 1, 8]). However, early security research work about XML was not directly related to
the delegatable access control.
In this paper, we propose an access control model developing delegation authorization rules for XML documents
that allows flexible data granularity and limited inference
protection. The policy specification is basically DTD-based
and it can also be considered as document-based.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2,
we review some basics in XML. In section 3, we give the
definitions of some basic components for our system and
authorization elements. In section 4, we study the delegatable authorization and in section 5, we describe the access
control process with delegatable authorization. In the final
section, we conclude this paper.

2. XML Basics
In this section, we review some basic concepts in XML.

2.1. XML DOM Tree Structure
The Document Object Model (DOM) is a platform- and
language-neutral interface for dynamically accessing and
updating the content, structure, and style of XML documents. The DOM provides a standard set of objects for representing documents, a standard model of how these objects
can be combined, and a standard interface for accessing and
manipulating them. The basic construct of an XML document is the element and the attribute. Elements can be
nested at any depth and can contain other elements. Attributes can also be specified for an element. An XML document can be represented by a tree structure. A node of the
tree could be different types (elements, attributes). Each element/attribute in XML can be represented as a node in a
DOM tree.
Since XML has a tree-shaped hierarchical structure and
an XML document is composed of several elements [6].
Each element corresponds to a node in the tree. Access control must be processed using a changed DOM tree.
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2.2. Fine-Grained Access Requirement for XML

3.2. Xpath and Object

With access control technology, the access control policies control how an XML document appears to different
users. The policies also insure the document is securely updated as specified by the privileged subjects. As we can
see, an XML document is structured into elements and attributes. Elements can contain elements. An attribute can
also be represented by an element. Protection of XML
sources with a large number of documents has various protection requirements. For example, in a hospital environment, information about nurses in a department can be made
available to everyone, whereas information about an patient
could be kept hidden from most subjects and made visible
only to a restricted number of authorized subjects. To ensure
a differentiated and appropriate protection of the contents of
XML documents, different levels of protection granularity
from an attribute to the whole document are required.

XPath is a language to express a path or selective nodes
in a XML tree. An object can be any node of an Xpath tree.
In the proposed Access Control Model, XPath models an
XML document as a tree of nodes. We define each object
as a node of a DOM tree and the objects will be denoted
by the path expression XPath. For example the following
Xpath expression could locate the name elements of the patient whose blood sugar level is greater than 11.5 and whose
name starts with a letter J.

2.3. DTD

//descendant::patient[descendant::
blood_sugar_level>11.5/descendant::
name[starts-with(child::textnode( ),"J"]

An object represents a set of elements or a single element
in a target XML document. We identify it by a XPath expression, specifying it with an “href” attribute. Authorizations specified for an element are intended to be applicable
to all its child non-element nodes such as attribute nodes
and text nodes. For example, a read authorization for an element node means that one can read all its child nodes except for sub-elements. The objects have an element-based
hierarchical structure.

DTD (Document Type Definitions) is a standardized
means of describing XML document type. It is similar to
the basic principle of object oriented programming: objects
are grouped and described as an object class. DTD can be
attached to XML documents, specifying the authorization
rules that XML documents may follow. DTD level policies
automatically propagate to all DTD instances and policies
specified on DTD elements automatically propagate to all
associated attributes and links. The following is the example of DTD.
In the above example, the hospital can be referred to
as the root of the tree. The elements following the root
denote the nodes of the tree, which describe the information
of patient.

In the proposed model, we have the constant set of authorization type T = -, +, ∗. Negative “-” specifies that the
access must be forbidden; positive “+” specifies that the access must be granted and the symbol “∗” is a special character denoting delegatable administrative privilege. It specifies that the access must be delegated as well as granted.
(“∗” equals to “+” plus administrative privilege on the access).

3. Specification for Authorization Rules

3.4. Privileges (Access rights)

3.1. Subject

We also regard the privilege as the access right. Our
model supports two kinds of privileges: browsing and updating.
Browsing privilege authorizes a subject to view an element or navigate through the link of the element. Updating privileges allow subjects to modify (or delete) the content of an element or to append new information in an element.

A subject is specified by user-set and group-set, where
user-set and group-set are a set of role names and group
names, respectively. Both users and groups may have hierarchical structures.
<!
<!
<!
<!
<!

ELEMENT
ELEMENT
ELEMENT
ELEMENT
ELEMENT

<! ELEMENT

subjects (users, groups)>
users (numbers*)>
numbers (name?)>
name #PCDATA>
member id ID>
Idref IDREF>
groups ((ANY|member)*)>

<! ELEMENT
<! Attlist

3.3. Authorization Types

3.5. Propagation Options
There are three types of propagation options available in
our model:
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object EMPTY>
object href CDATA #REQUIRED>

Type
NO_PROP

UP_CASCADE

DOWN_CASCADE

Semantics
The security policy applies only to the
protection objects defined in its
specification; no authorization
propagation is performed.
The authorization of an element
(object) is propagated to its
parent element if there is no
authorization for its parent element.
The authorization of an element
(object) is propagated to its sub
-elements if there is no authorization
for the sub-elements.

4. Delegatable Authorization Rule
4.1. Delegation Management
The delegation policies allow the grantor of an authorization policy to delegate some or all of their access rights to
a new set of subjects (grantees). Effectively, when a grantor
performs a delegation action, a new administrator for that
access is created. If users want to distribute the administration of rights without further control, they just delegate the
rights to others and let them do grant thereafter. Whenever
users want to take some control of the rights, their grants
will always have higher priorities [3] based on our conflict
resolution policy. The delegation is a transference of a access right from one grantor to grantee. After the delegation,
the grantee retains the access right. For example, in the hospital environment, a nurse has no permission to perform surgical operations, which was granted to doctors and specialists only. So the nurse could not access the some sensitive
information regarding the patient. But, sometimes a nurse
may assist surgical operation upon a doctor’s request. In this
case, the doctor may delegate some privileges to the nurse
who was requested to assist the operation and the nurse may
get permission to access that portion of information about
this patient. In this delegation, the nurse is grantee and the
doctor is grantor. With delegatable access control the permissions of accessing XML can be performed temporarily.

4.2. Conflict Resolution
Since we support different types of access rights, conflicting authorizations may arise where a user is granted two
different types of access rights. Thus a proper conflict resolution policy is needed. We solve conflicts as follows. First,
trace the delegation relation path explicitly. When a conflict
occurs, we will see if the two grantors fall into a delegation
path. If they do, then let the authorization with the grantor as

the predecessor in the path override the other one. In other
words, along the delegation path, the predecessors’ grants
have higher priority than the successors’ grants. This policy can support well-controlled delegation. Second, if the
conflicts can not be solved by the above policy, we will use
Negative-take-precedence based policy to resolve the conflicts. That is, we will resolve the conflicts according to their
types, and the priority sequence is − > + > ∗. This policy favors security.

4.3. Definition of the Authorization Rules
In this section, we introduce the definition of our authorization rules, including the general access rule and the delegatable authorization rule.
Definition 1 (General Access Rule). We define the general
access rule as a term of type S × O × T × A × P . S is
a set of subjects which can be users, roles or groups. O =
target + path(V,E). target is an XML or DTD. path
is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where V is
a set of nodes. E is a set of edges. T is a set of authorization types. A is the set of access rights. P is the propagation
option.
The general authorization is represented as a 5-tuple of
the form:
D =<subject,target+path,authorization_type,
access_right,propagation_type>

which denotes subject grant the access right on Xpath specified object with authorization type and propagation type.
Here, subject ∈ S,
target ∈ O,
authorization_type ∈ {+, −},
access_right ∈ {browsing,updating},
propogation_type ∈ {NO_PROP,
UP_CASCADE,DOWN_CASCADE}.

In the delegation process, the entity that has been given
the access right to delegate by another entity, who has the
delegatable access right, can perform valid delegations. The
following is the definition of our delegatable rule.
Definition 2 (Delegatable Rule). The delegatable authorization is a term: S × O × T × A × S × P rule, where S
is a set of subjects which would be grantor or grantee; O =
target + path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path
is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where V is
a set of nodes and E is a set of edges; T is an authorization type; A is the set of access rights, and P is the propagation option.
The delegatable authorization is represented as a 6-tuple
of the form:
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D =< grantee,target+path,authorization_type,
access_right,grantor,propagation_type>

which reads that grantee is granted by grantor the access
right on Xpath specified object with authorization type and
propagation type. Here, grantor ∈ S,
grantee ∈ S,
target ∈ O,
authorization_type ∈ {+, −, ∗},
access_right ∈ {browsing, updating},
propogation_type ∈ {NO_PROP, UP_CASCADE,
DOWN_CASCADE}.

The structure of the authorization rules can be specified
at the level of a DTD schema or document instance level.
The following is an example of the policies for a XML documents using the delegatable authorization rules:
<policy>
<access_rule subject="nurses"
target = "patient_information.xml"
path="//patient/personnel_information"
authorization_type = "-"
access_right = "updating"
propagation_type = "NO_PROP"
/>

<! ELEMENT delegation_rules EMPTY>
<! ATTLIST grantee (#PCDATA)>
<! ATTLIST object (#PCDATA)
>
<! ATTLIST authorization_type( + | - | * )
#REQUIRED>
<! ATTLIST access_right(browsing|updating)
#REQUIRED>
<! ATTLIST grantor (#PCDATA)>
<! ATTLIST propagation_type (NO_PROP,
UP_CASCADE,DOWN_CASCADE) #REQUIRED>

The delegation rule is the element with 6 attributes which
are grantee, object, authorization type, access right, grantor
and propagation type. It also lists the types of attributes being available or declared.

5. Delegatable Access Control Process

Access control processes are determined based on information about access rights, security policies, authorization
rules, and other factors depending on the system environment. Through access control, the system can restrict unauthorized users’ access to resources in the system and guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of the resources. Our
delegatable access control process has to complete the fol<delegatable_rule
lowing steps. The concept of the model is illustrated in the
grantee="//nurse[department="surgery"]" Figure 2.
target = "patient_information.xml"
path = "//patient[blood_sugar_level>
11.5]/name[starts-with "J"] "
authorization_type = "*"
access_right = "browsing"
grantor = "doctor"
propagation_type = "DOWN_CASCADE"

/>
</policy>

XML/DTD
(Security policy
+ Rule ) XAS

S1

S2

S2

The first rule says that the nurses are forbidden to update
the content of the patients personnel information. The second rule says that the nurse in the department of surgery was
delegated the permission of browsing by the doctor to access the information on the patient whose blood sugar level
is greater than 11.5 and the name begins with “J”. The propagation type DOWN_CASCADE means the authorization is
propagated to all sub-elements of the object.

4.4. Define the structure of authorization rules on
DTD level
As we described in the earlier chapter, a DTD defines
the structure of a set of XML documents and the authorizations (at different granularity levels) that can be specified at
the DTD level and propagated to all documents. We could
define the structure of authorization rules on DTD as following,

IEEE

Labeled
Tree

S3

Transformed
Tree

S2
Delegable Authorizations

Figure 1. XML delegatable access control
process.

In the process, the step S1 is the parsing step which consists of the syntax check of the requested document with respect to the associated DTD and its compilation to obtain an
object-oriented document graph according to the DOM format. Step S2 is Tree labelling and authorization checking.
This step involves the propagation of the labelling of the
DOM tree according to the authorizations listed in the XAS
(XML Access Sheet) associated with the document and its
DTD, both at the organization and at site level. The authorizations relevant to the user are analyzed and applied to the
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nodes. S3 is the step of transformation and unparsing. The
transformation phase is a pruning of the DOM tree according to its labelling.
The example in Figure 3 shows how a tree is pruning. With access control specification, the read accessibility view is implied by the labeled XML tree (T1). Nodes
O4 and O8 are forbidden to have view accessibility with respect to specific user U1 . After transformation, the pruned
tree(T2) only remains the nodes with view privileges. This
pruning preserves the validity of the document with respect
to the loosened version of its original DTD.
By unparsing, the resulting XML document together
with the loosened DTD, can then be transmitted to the user
who requested access to the document.

O1

O1

O2

O3

O2

O3
(T2)

(T1)

U1

O4

O6

O5

O7

O8

O5

O6

O7

Figure 2. DOM tree pruning transformation.

The process sets all elements and attributes in DTD to be
optional so that the existing DTD be preserved even if nodes
are removed from the DOM tree. The user who has been authorized through such a process views only that part of the
XML document, for which he/she has been given the right
to access, and the user who has not been authorized cannot access the other part. This is the way how data security
(confidentiality) is guaranteed.

6. Conclusion
XML Access Control aims at providing XML documents
with a sophisticated access control model and fine-grained
access control specification language. Access control is a
means to allow or deny subjects to carry out operations
on objects in the computer system [2, 10]. In XML documents, users have to share resources and communicate with
each other to perform their jobs more efficiently. There is a
strong demand for the access control of distributed-shared
resources. For better performance, it is important to keep

resources and the information integrity from an unexpected
user on fine-grained level. In this paper, our access control
model for XML is described allowing for definition and enforcement of access restrictions directly on the structure and
content of XML documents, thus providing a simple and
effective way for users to protect information at the same
granularity level provided by the language itself. Our model
also supports authorization propagations and authorization
delegations.
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